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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE:
A ־STATUS VALUE־. FORMULATION
I. Introduction.
The theory of distributive justice is concerned with the way in which 
socially valued rewards, such as salaries, promotions, or privileges, 
are allocated to members of social systems. Its basic notions are 
that actors have what they regard as legitimate expectations about how 
rewards are to be allocated, that these expectations arise from compar­
isons with other actors, and if such expectations are violated there is 
both strain and pressure for change.
Examples.
To fix the problem clearly in mind we take two examples from the 
study of wage comparisons, although wage comparisons are only one among 
many instances of what is essentially the same sort of process.
(1) In the billing office of a public utility the status "ledger 
clerk" is more skilled, responsible, autonomous, and senior than the 
status "cash poster" but the two are paid the same wage. Actors in both 
statuses regard this as unjust, and the ledger clerks agitate in their 
union for a wage differential. The ledger clerks show all the signs of 
relative deprivation. (See Homans, 1953.)
(2) The ledger clerks regard themselves as underpaid, but this is 
not always true in every case of distributive injustice, as the following 
example shows : A number of college students are employed through a 
university employment office to interview for a survey research organization.
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In their initial employment interview, half the students are told by 
their "employer" that they are qualified for their job, because they are 
so well-educated, and that they will be paid 30 cents per interview. The 
remaining students are told that they are not qualified for their job, 
because they lack experience, but they are hired anyway because of the 
pressure of time. The "employer" pays the going rate, 30 cents per 
interview, but complains that this is really the rate for qualified inter­
viewers. Thus the first group is clearly labelled by instructions as 
appropriately paid while the second is overpaid. Both groups are then 
given a simple interview task. Overpaid subjects work harder, but earn 
less; that is, they produce fewer interviews, but of higher quality.
(See Adams, 1963.)
In general, the characteristic features of a distributive justice 
situation appear to be:
(a) Rewards are allocated to actors on the basis of one or more 
socially defined and evaluated characteristics.
(b) That a given level of reward is appropriate to a given state 
of a characteristic is determined by comparisons between kinds 
of actors.
(c) If two actors have similar states of similar characteristics 
they have a right to expect similar rewards as well.
(d) If similar actors have dissimilar rewards, or dissimilar 
actors have similar rewards, normative expectations are 
violated.
(e) Violation of expectations about reward produce strain and 
some sort of pressure to change the situation.
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In the literature on the subject the violation of expectations 
referred to in (e) has been variously called inequity, injustice, 
disequilibration, inconsistency, or imbalance.
2. Formulations of the Justice Problem.
The history of the justice problem has been closely connected with 
that of the status inconsistency problem. The earliest formulation was 
Weber's "Class, Status, and Party"(see Gerth and Mills, 1946), in which 
three basic dimensions of a stratification system are conceptually 
distinguished, but it is supposed that in time positions in the three 
tend to equilibrate. The Weberian formulation was restated in 1944 by 
Benoit-Smullyan, whose paper became the point of departure for much of the 
later interest in the problem. Benoit-Smullyan added to Weber's formula­
tion the notion that if equilibrating tendencies were blocked in some way, 
there would be pressure for radical change. Why thi6 should be so 
Benoit-Smullyan did not attempt to explain. The first attempts at an 
explanation of the phenomenon, by Lenski in 1956, were based on Hughes* 
status ambiguity formulation (Hughes, 1945). Lenski claimed that 
inconsistent status creates status ambiguity, status ambiguity creates 
tension, and this tension is reduced by bringing statuses into line.
In the process of constructing his formulation, Lenski to some degree 
simplified the process as Benoit-Smullyan had understood it. In 
Benoit-Smullyan economic processes, power processes, and status processes 
were all treated as if they were one process obeying the same laws.
Lenski made no attempt to deal with power, which he treated as if it 
obeyed different principles.
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In two respects, a marked advance over Lenski's formulation was 
made by Homans (whose earliest theoretical ideas about the equilibration 
phenomenon are found in Zaleznik, Christenson, and Roethlisberger, 19 58). 
First, he saw for the first time that the equilibration phenomenon 
behaved like a relative deprivation process, and therefore made compar­
isons central to his theory. Second, he saw that status ambiguity and 
the allocation of rewards were two different processes. For Lenski, 
though he had simplified the problem by comparison with Benoit-Smullyan, 
nevertheless treated ambiguity and justice as if they were one unitary 
process. It is in Homans that for the first time the justice problem 
per se emerges as a distinct theoretical concern.
In formulating status congruence, or ambiguity, Homans followed 
closely the Hughes conceptualization. But in formulating distributive 
justice Homans made use of a new kind of explanation, not previously 
seen in discussions of the equilibration phenomenon. This new explana­
tion, in terms of social exchange, has become the most important focus 
of contemporary concern and research on the problem of justice. In 
general, all exchange formulations of justice concern themselves with 
compensation for effort expended. Effort has a certain exchange value, 
in the sense that its amount or quality will elicit reward from others. 
Reward too has a certain exchange value, in the sense that it elicits 
effort from others. For an exchange of effort and reward to take place 
the reward must in some sense be enough, or appropriate to the effort. 
Whether or not a reward jls enough is a relative matter: it is not a 
function of the absolute magnitude of reward but of the proportionality 
of reward to effort. To determine whether rewards are proportional to
effort one must make a comparison between the ratio of reward to effort 
for two or more actors allocated rewards by the same source, or who are 
in some other way part of the same reward-allocation system. If the 
effort/reward ratios of the two are equal, their rewards are fair.
The two most important variants of the exchange formulation are 
Homans' own theory (1961) and Adams (1965). In Homans' theory an 
exchange is just if profits are proportional to investments. The idea 
of profit may be defined in the following manner: Let p be an individual 
who must choose between two alternatives, A or B. The consequence of 
chosing A has a certain positive value for p; call this its reward.
But B also has a certain positive value, and if p chooses A he foregoes 
the reward he would otherwise obtain by choosing B. Call this reward 
foregone the cost of choosing A. The profit associated with choosing A 
is the reward minus the cost of A. There is, of course, a profit 
associated with each of the two alternatives. It can be assumed that p 
will choose the more profitable alternative. Now define an exchange 
situation as one in which p's choice has consequences not only for him­
self but for another, say o. One may then imagine the interaction of p 
and o as a sequence of transactions each of which involves a profit to 
both p and o. Profits may be increased by increasing the value of the 
activities in a transaction. This could be done by making an investment, 
say in training or experience, which would raise the quality of p's 
contributions to o. A reward is just if profit is proportional to 
investment. This can be determined by comparing p's profit/investment 
ratio to that of another actor in the system, such as o. The two ratios 
must be equal.
Adaras' theory (1963, 1965) differs in some respects, partly because 
it was originally a cognitive dissonance formulation. More recently, 
however (1965), it has clearly emerged as an exchange theory. In 
Adams, an exchange is equitable if outcomes are proportional to inputs. 
Inputs are any contributions made by p to an exchange. Energy, amount 
of effort, quality of effort, training to improve the quality of effort, 
would all be classed as inputs. Outcomes are any consequences that 
follow from the contributions made by p to the exchange. Approval, 
money, gifts, or respect would all be classed as outcomes. In Adams, 
as in Homans, satisfaction with outcomes is a relative matter: It is 
not a function of the absolute value of outcomes, but is determined by 
comparisons with others and behaves like a relative deprivation 
phenomenon. To determine if one deserves an outcome one compares the 
input/outcome ratios of two or more persons in the same reward-allocation 
system. An outcome is equitable if the two ratios are equal, and 
inequitable if they are not.
3. Reasons for Preferring an Alternative to the Exchange Formulation.
The basic purpose of the present paper is to offer an alternative 
to the exchange formulation of distributive justice. In this section 
our purpose is to show why we believe a new formulation is required.
A new formulation is required, in our view, for three reasons:
First, the exchange formulations do not actually define justice in a 
precise and unambiguous manner. Second, they do not actually explain 
some important features of the allocation of rewards. Third, the way in 
which they treat status, reward, and comparison lead to some questionable 
empirical consequences.
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If we attempt to deal with these three problems, we may try to do 
so within the terms of the original formulation or we may try to recon- 
ceptualize the problem. We propose to argue that the problems in the 
exchange formulation are such that they cannot be dealt with without 
looking at status, reward, and comparison in quite different ways. Hence 
our interest in proposing an alternative formulation.
Difficulties in the Definition of Justice.
In conceptualizing exchange in terms of effort and compensation for 
effort, exchange formulations are led to define distributive justice as 
the equality of two effort/reward ratios. An example of how such a 
definition might look is shown in 3.1 below.
3.1 $300 per month = $900 per month = 75
4 years of 12 years of
training training
Dividing both sides, each ratio equals 75. Therefore the rewards are just.
But at most such equalities are suggestive. For most of the time 
they can be constructed only by forcing the analogy to effort. In 
exchange formulations statuses such as sex, age, ethnicity, or race are 
among the things classified as effort. Therefore it is possible to 
define justice by ratios such as 3.2.
3.2 $300 per month = $900 per month = J
Female Male
But of course one does not actually divide by denominators like male, or 
white, or Italian, or middle-aged. In general, from ratios like 3.2 no 
generally meaningful result is obtained, nor does the result vhen
-7-
meaningful precisely define states of justice and injustice. The only 
possible conclusion is that the definition of justice in exchange 
formulations is useable only as an imprecise analogy.
Status and Reward.
Exchange formulations leave some important properties of justice 
unexplained. First, they do not take into account the special signi­
ficance in distributive justice of small reward-differentials. Not 
uncommonly injustice occurs in situations such as example 3.3 in which 
the upshot is likely to be that Asst. Professor p demands another $500
3.3 Asst. Professor p has been well thought of at
University V for three years, receiving normal 
merit increases every year. This makes his salary 
equal to that of o just hired by V, because the 
market price for new Ph.D.'s has increased each 
year at the same rate as V's raises.
or so from his chairman. Is it greater purchasing power that p is 
asking for? Is it the absolute size of the salary that is really 
important to p? Or is it not more important that there simply be some 
kind of reward-differential, and of a magnitude that has status signifi­
cance to p?
The importance of small reward-differentials cannot be understood 
unless a distinction is firmly established between the consummatory and 
the status value of reward. The distinction we intend is of course 
Veblen's (1899). Veblen conceded that one aspect of rewards was the value 
to an actor of their use in consumption:
"The end of acquisition and accumulation is conventionally 
held to be the consumption of the goods accumulated. . . . Such 
consumption may of course be conceived to serve the consumer's
physical wants--his physical comfort־־or his so-called higher 
wants־־spiritual, aesthetic, intellectual, or what not . .
(Veblen, 1899, p. 25)
But, though one might want things in order to use them, consume them, and
through consumption satisfy needs, Veblen felt only among the poor did
accumulation satisfy a consummatory purpose. Among the more wealthy,
. . it is only when taken in a sense far removed from its 
naive meaning that consumption of goods can be said to afford 
the incentive from which accumulation invariably proceeds."
(Ibid.)
If the consummatory needs of the wealthy do not motivate accumulation, it
does not follow that they have no motivation to accumulate. Indeed, they
have a quite passionate desire to acquire, because aside from their
consummatory value,
" . . .  possession of wealth confers honor; it is an invidious 
distinction." (Ibid, p. 26)
Thus, objects possessed and objects consumed can stand for worth, respect,
esteem, social standing: in other words they have status significance.
But in exchange formulations no account is taken of the important
differences between consummatory and status value.
If the status significance of small reward-differentials is not
accounted for in exchange formulations, neither is the significance of
age, sex, ethnicity, race, or other status characteristics. All these
characteristics, which often form the basis on which rewards are allocated,
are treated by analogy with the amount or quality of effort. In Homans,
for example, they are all classified as investments. Investments are
efforts to acquire a certain capacity to contribute to the accomplishment
of some goal. Thus, education and seniority might be thought of as effort
expended to acquire high skill. But it is hard to see that age, sex,
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race, or ethnicity can be looked at in the same way. Is effort expended 
to become thirty, male, and white? Is it for that effort that actors are 
compensated? In example 3.2, is it the difference in the "investments" 
of males that is rewarded by the difference in wages?
We thus have two kinds of clues to the importance of status value 
in distributive justice: First, that small differences in reward can be 
so important in feelings of distributive justice; second, that status- 
significant characteristics are so prominent among what Homans calls 
investments. For just as with rewards, we can distinguish the value of 
investments in exchange from their status value, though this distinction 
plays no part in exchange formulations.
Justice as a Moral Phenomenon.
Just as exchange formulations do not account for the status 
significance of social characteristics and rewards in distributive justice, 
so also they fail to explain how normative expectations about rewards 
emerge. The moral character of justice is one of its special peculiari­
ties. It is seen in the fact, first, that under-rewarded actors are not 
simply dissatisfied, they are morally indignant; and second, in the 
fact that over-rewarded actors do not simply owe something to somebody, 
they are guilty. We would hazard the guess that even people who are 
neither over- nor under-rewarded feel about injustice that disinterested 
outrage that sociologists associate with the violation of normative order. 
Though it does not touch them personally, people will feel incensed at 
the shabby treatment of the under-rewarded or the inexcusable favoratism 
shown the over-rewarded.
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More than is the case with most other formulations of the problem, 
the observations and investigations that support exchange formulations 
point to the importance that must be given to normative expectations in 
distributive justice. But the moral character of justice is not 
explicitly dealt with in exchange theory; exchange theorists nowhere 
attempt to show just how normative expectations about appropriate levels 
of reward emerge; and we believe that if they had tried to show how 
expectations emerge they could not have done so from the assumptions they 
make. There simply are no assumptions in exchange theory that will 
accomplish this task.
Comparisons.
Exchange formulations do not account for some aspects of the justice 
phenomenon that are important to it; but they suffer also from the 
opposite difficulty that some of the things they attempt to account for 
aren't so. Most of the problems of the latter sort arise from their 
conceptualization of comparisons.
There are two basic ways of formulating comparisons. The first is 
to suppose, as exchange formulations do suppose, that p compares himself 
with o. Comparisons in which one individual compares himself with another 
particular individual may be called local. The second is to suppose that 
p compares himself, not with o in particular, but with a generalized 
other. Thus, if p is an airline mechanic, instead of comparing himself 
to another particular person who is a mechanic, he might compare himself 
to "people who are highly skilled mechanics." Comparisons in which one 
individual compares himself with a generalized other may be called 
referential.
Current exchange theories formulate comparisons as local. But 
strictly local comparison is not sufficient to produce a distributive 
justice process. What unfolds if comparison jLs strictly local is a 
quite different process, best described as anomie. This is seen from 
examining the functions comparison is supposed to perform in distributive 
justice situations.
The purpose of comparison is to define the meaning that can be given 
to a particular reward. In example 3.4 there is no way to say whether
3.4 P is paid $3.52 an hour.
$3.52 is too much, too little, or the right wage for p. The meaning of 
the wage is undefined. In example 3.4' the problem appears to be solved, 
providing p feels he is similar to o. P is underpaid. But why should
3.4' P is paid $3.52 an hour while o is paid $4.33
an hour.
we draw that conclusion? Why not draw the conclusion that p is paid an 
appropriate wage and o is overpaid? Or even that both are overpaid, but 
o more than p? There is no basis for the claim that local comparison, 
of which 3.4' is an example, defines the significance of a reward.
But suppose that, as in example 3.5, p believes highly-skilled
3.5 P is a skilled mechanic paid $3.52 an hour.
Skilled mechanics typically make $4.30 an hour.
Unskilled mechanics typically make $3.50 an hour.
mechanics make about $4.30 an hour. Certainly there is no longer any 
doubt about how he defines the situation. He will believe he is underpaid.
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The difference between 3.5 and 3.4' lies in the use made by p of a stable 
frame of reference in terms of which local, particular comparisons are 
given their meaning. This frame of reference consists of generalized 
others, such as "skilled mechanics," and beliefs about the wage typically 
paid to them.
If comparisons have meaning only in terms of a frame of reference, 
what local comparison produces must be a process quite different from 
distributive justice. In distributive justice p knows he has been 
unjustly rewarded; in local comparison he knows nothing of the sort. In 
fact, p's problem is that he does not know how to define the situation in 
which he finds himself. His problem is to establish some standard. In 
other words, he is anomic. No doubt he is anxious and wants to change 
the situation. But his problem is not to protest injustice.
Hence we argue that no justice phenomenon arises in the absence of 
a stable frame of reference. If once this view is accepted, it has far- 
reaching consequences for the theory of distributive justice, because 
both justice and injustice have different meanings in local as compared 
to referential comparison. What is called a "just" state in local com­
parison sometimes is "unjust" viewed in terms of referential comparison, 
while some of the "unjust" states of local comparisons are "just" in 
referential comparisons. Even two states that are "unjust" in both views 
are seen as quite different kinds of injustice in referential as opposed 
to local comparison.
For example, when comparison is thought of only as local 3.6 is 
always just, since similar individuals are paid similar wages. But 3.6 
is not always just. If skilled mechanics in general typically make $4.30
3.6 P is a skilled mechanic paid $3.52 an hour.
0 is a skilled mechanic paid $3.52 an hour.
an hour, both p and o are unjustly paid, and instead of their being 
satisfied with their wage the foundation is established for a protest 
coalition. On the other hand, 3.7 may appear to involve injustice to 
both p and o in terms of local comparison. Is this reasonable?
3.7 P is a skilled mechanic paid $4.30 an hour.
0 is a skilled mechanic paid $3.52 an hour.
Or is it more reasonable to say that as skilled mechanics typically earn 
$4.30, o is underpaid, but p is not. P may regard the system as unjust, 
and this may undermine its moral standing in his eyes, but it is not p 
himself who is unjustly rewarded.
Strictly local comparison confuses not only justice and injustice, 
but also different kinds of injustice. More accurately, in local 
comparison it is not possible to make distinctions that in referential 
comparison assume great importance. In 3.6 both p and o share the same 
injustice; in 3.7 only o is unjustly paid. Collective injustice should 
have different consequences than individual injustice, if for no other 
reason than the social support the sharing of injustice provides. 
Furthermore, in 3.7, while there is injustice in the system, p himself is 
not unjustly rewarded; his response will be a response to the moral 
injustice of there being others, unlike himsalf, who are unjustly treated. 
This situation, in which there is one individual injustice but it is the 
other who is rewarded unjustly, contrasts with 3.4' in which also there 
is one individual injustice, but it is p himself who is the unjustly 
rewarded individual.
Thus, we argue that the distributive justice process is obscur-id 
by formulating comparison as local. First, anomic states come to be 
confused with unjust states. Second, some states that are just are 
identified as unjust. Third, some states that are unjust are identified 
as just. Fourth, collective injustice cannot be distinguished from 
individual injustice. Fifth, situations in which it is oneself who is 
unjustly rewarded are not distinguished from those in which it is the 
other person who is unjustly rewarded. Sixth, it is not even possible 
to always correctly distinguish situations of over-reward from those of 
under-reward.
If such distinctions make a difference to how p will respond to 
injustice, and in our view they will, it is difficult to see how any 
lawful regularities in the behavior of distributive justice are to 
emerge if such distinctions are obscured. Thus, to make useful pre­
dictions about distributive justice, careful thought will have to be 
given to the nature and function of referential structures in comparisons.
4. The Theory of Status Value.
We have four tasks: (a) To conceptualize the properties of status 
and reward in terms of their status-value; section 4 is devoted to this,
(b) To conceptualize the frame of reference in terms of which comparisons 
are given their meaning, and to analyze its properties; section 5 is 
devoted to this. (3) To use these concepts and properties to show how 
normative expectations about appropriate levels of reward emerge; 
section 6 is devoted to this. (4) To give a meaningful and precise 
definition of the state of distributive justice; section 7 is devoted 
to this.
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The theory of status value is concerned with evaluations of worth, 
esteem, or honor. "Status significance" in this usage means "honorific 
significance." Two kinds of elements may have status significance: states 
of characteristics and states of goal-objects. A characteristic. C, is 
any feature or aspect of a person that might be used to describe him, 
such as energy, height, or skin color. A state of a characteristic,
C^, might be, in the case of energy, high or low; in the case of height, 
tall or short; in the case of skin color, light or dark. In the present 
paper, all characteristics are treated as if they had only two states 
(hence the subscript x identifying states can take the values a or b 
only). A goal-ob iectt, GO, is any object, tangible or intangible, that 
an actor might want, or that might satisfy some need, such as shelter, 
an income, or a title.* A state of a goal-object, GO^ (x - a,b) might 
be simple or elaborate shelter, a high or low income, a noble title or 
no title at all. A state of a characteristic or goal-object is distinct 
from the notion of its status value; for example, a state such as "great 
physical strength" might be given either positive or negative status 
value, might be good in some cultures, bad in others.
Every status situation is conceptualized from the point of view of 
some given actor, p. Other actors and indeed p himself, are treated as
^In the more precise context of the theory of status value, we use 
the term "goal-object" instead of the term "reward" for three reasons : 
reward often connotes only positive value, where we want to talk both 
of positive and negative values; reward often connotes various psycho­
logical notions about effects on p, such as reinforcement, that play no 
part in our formulation; and reward often connotes direct gratification 
of p, through consumption of the reward-־exactly the wrong connotation for 
our theory. But suitably stripped of any such connotations, one could 
use the term "reward" in place of "goal-objects" and understand what we 
mean quite well.
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objects of p's orientation. That is, p is aware of and responds to other 
actors, but what is important in the theory is only p's awareness of and 
response to them. For example, the theory does not attempt to predict 
their behavior, except in the sense that other actors may of course also 
be treated as the actor p. Objects of orientation may include p as an 
object to himself (denoted p'), another particular actor, o, or such 
generalized objects as "airline mechanics," or "business executives."
As notation, generalized objects will be distinguished from particular 
objects, p' and o, by upper case Roman letters, such as Y and Z.
It is sometimes useful to refer to general properties of any 
instance of an object of orientation, p' , o, Y, or Z, in which case we 
designate objects as x ^ . The corresponding notation for states of C and 
GO will be e^.
The actor p may regard any object, x ^ , as possessing any element 
e^, or p may expect that x^ possesses e^. Our idea of possession is 
straightforward; but expectation is used here both for normative and 
cognitive expectation. Ue want to cover by the term somewhat more than 
"to anticipate," but we also do not want to exclude this meaning. Thus, 
we mean that p thinks x^ ought to possess e^, but do not preclude his 
also predicting that x^ actually will possess e^.
P may regard txro distinct states of C or two distinct states of GO 
as similar or dissimilar. For example, an airline mechanic may compare 
himself to an automobile mechanic and believe that they have the same 
state (high) of the same characteristic (mechnical skill). Similarity 
involves both similarity with respect to characteristic or goal-object, 
and similarity with respect to the state of the characteristic or
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goal-object. The airline mechanic must believe both that the same sort 
of mechanical skills are common to airline and automobile mechanics and 
that they have the same degree of skill. Similarity, like status value, 
or any other aspect of a status situation, is seen from p's point of 
view; what matters, that is, is whether p regards two states as similar, 
not whether the sociologist regards them as similar.
We now use the ideas of possession, and expectation of possession,
2to define two fundamental relations in the theory of status value.
Definition 1. An element e is associated with an element e., if 
it is the case that: if x^ possesses e^, then 
x^ possesses e^•
Definition 2. An element e. is relevant to an element e , if it 
is the case foiat: if x^ possesses e^, then x^ is 
expected to possess
Certain important implications follow immediately from these two 
definitions. First note that:
4.1 If e. is associated with e. and e. is associated with
it___ ___ J __________ J J Jj J.L ^ Je^> Ihen e^ is associated 4ith e^.
For "e^ is associated with e y  means that if x^ possesses e^, then x^ 
possesses e^; and "e^ is associated with e^" means that if x^ possesses 
ej, then x^ possesses e^. From this it follows that if x^ possesses e^, 
x^ possesses e^. Hence association is transitive.
2For readers of "The Stability of Organizational Status Systems" 
(Zelditch, Cohen, Berger, 1966), where an earlier formulation of the 
theory of status value was described, one of the major changes in the 
theory developed here is in the way relevance, which we are about to 
define, was treated in that paper. Relevance was in the prior formu­
lation introduced as a primitive term. Here it is a defined term, and 
moreover is broken down into two distinct ideas, association and 
relevance.
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Also note that:
4.2 If e^ is associated with ej and ej Is relevant to e^!
3
then e. is relevant to e, .' i k
This follows from definitions 1 and 2 taken together.
Finally, note that association and relevance are not symmetrical 
relations. For example, it is quite possible to say that is associated 
with GO without claiming at the same time that GO is associated withX X
C . Suppose that Negroes are in p's eyes typically poor. It does notX
follow that p regards the poor as typically Negro. Therefore we 
distinguish the association of e^ to e^ from the association of e^ to 
e^. The same is true of relevance.
We now use the primitive idea of similarity, and our defined 
concepts of association, and relevance, to study how status value spreads: 
That is, how states that have no particular significance in and of 
themselves come to mean something important to p about the place occupied 
by p' and o in a status situation. We will not be concerned with how 
states acquire status-value ab initio. Though the problem is of 
obvious importance, it requires a theory of its own and one not relevant 
to the problem of distributive justice. But once at least one status­
valued element is given in a status situation, S, it is our view that 
other elements of the same situation come to be defined by their relations
3Note that certain important ideas do not follow from definitions 1 
and 2. For example, it does not follow that: if e¿ is relevant to ej and 
ej is relevant to e^, then e¿ is relevant to e^. Therefore, if we believe 
transitivity of relevance to be true, it must be made an independent 
assumption of the theory of status value. However, we do not need such an 
assumption for the problem of the present paper, and so omit further 
discussion of it.
to the already valued elements of the situation. This occurs under the 
following conditions:
Assumption 1. (Spread of Status Value) Let e¿ be a non-status-
valued element of a status situation S, and let ej, 
e^,..., be status-valued elements of S. Let e¿ be 
similar to, associated with, or relevant to,ej, 
e^,...; or let e!, e^,..., be similar to, associated 
with, or relevant to,ei•
(1) e¿ acquires the status value of ej, e^,..., 
if ej, e^,..,, have the same status value.
(2) e¿ acquires no status value if ej, e^,..., have 
different status values.
Thus, if executives use different washrooms from blue collar workers 
in a factory, the key to the executive washroom acquires status signi­
ficance in the factory. For this to occur it is not actually necessary 
for there to be two or more status-valued elements in S, such as e^, 
e. ,...; the process will take place if there is only one. But if there 
are two or more such elements, assumption 1 claims that status value 
spreads only if they all have the same status value. If e ^ , e^,...f do 
not have the same status value, no status value is transferred to e^ at 
all. Thus, in an organization with only one washroom, used by everyone 
regardless of their status, there is no status significance attached to 
the washroom.
Note that the assumption is mute on the subject of 'any change in 
status value that might be expected of e^ if it is already status-valued 
when it becomes similar to, associated with, or relevant to, e^ and e^.
For example, the claim that e^ acquires no status value if e^ and e^ differ 
in value does not imply in any way that if e^ were already valued when it 
became attached to them it would decay in status value. If a washroom is
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used indiscriminately it will acquire no status significance. It does 
not follow that if it does have status significance and is then used 
indiscriminately it will lose its significance. While in the long run 
this may be so, there will first be a protracted process of conflict and 
tension. The reasoning that leads to this view is developed below after 
the idea of balance is introduced.
Prominent in many discussions of distributive justice is the idea 
that, like status value, relevance itself may spread along bonds created 
by similarity. For example: if p perceives that C ׳ is similar to CX X
and also that C is relevant to GO , then p will come to see C ׳ asX X  X
relevant to GO^. This is the sort of process one must suppose when air­
line mechanics come to believe they should have the same wage as 
automobile mechanics because airline mechanics have skills similar to 
those of automobile mechanics. The underlying idea seems to be a 
natural one. Explicitly stated:
Assumption 2. (Spread of Relevance) If e¿ is similar to ej and 
ej is associated with or relevant to e^, then ej 
will become relevant to e^ or to any element similar 
to ek .
Note that what spreads is relevance. not association. Thus, if e^ 
is similar to e , then either association• or relevance of e^ to e^ leads 
p to expect any object that possesses e^ to possess e^. Note also that 
unlike assumption 1, there is nothing that bars relevance from spreading 
between status elements that have different status value.
If the elements that come to be linked do have different status 
value, however, they are imbalanced. The idea of balance plays a key 
role in the theory of status value, because balance defines the conditions
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of stability of a status situation. (The formulation used here differs 
only slightly from that of two previous papers using the same notion.
See Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1966; or Zelditch, Berger, and Cohen, 
1966.) Balance of a status situation may be defined in three steps:
Definition 3.1. .[e¿, ejj is a relational unit if there exists 
an e¿ and ej such that
(1) is associated with ej or e^ with e^, or
(2) is relevant to e^ or e^ to e ^  or
(3) e. is similar to e ..i J
Because we have limited ourselves to dichotomous characteristics 
and goal־objects, the status values of the states of a given C or GO 
may be treated as if they were either positive or negative evaluations. 
Thus, for occupational classes, the white collar class may be treated as 
if it were the positively-evaluated class while the blue collar class 
may be treated as if it were the negatively-evaluated class. From this 
perspective,
Definition 3.2. A relational unit [e¿, e*] is balanced, if knd
only if e¿ and ej are both status-valued and the 
sign of their evaluation is the same.
Definition 3.3. A status situation S is balanced, if and only if 
all its relational units are balanced.
The idea of balance is now identified with the stability of a status
situation, and with freedom from strain or tension. Imbalance, on the
other hand, is identified with tension and pressures to change; and
when pressures do arise, they will be pressures to change the situation
from imbalance to balance.
Assumption 3. The status situation S is stable if and only 
if it is balanced.
By "stable" in this assumption we mean that the status situation 
will not change as a result of any pressures within the situation itself. 
Thus, assumption 3 is not a definition of the terms "balance" or 
"stability;" the two terms are independently defined. "Balance" is a 
term having to do with the agreement in evaluation of two or more related 
status states in a status situation; "stability" is a term having to do 
with pressures towards change in a status situation.
Assumption 4. If a status situation S is imbalanced, there
is tension generated within that status situation.
Assumption 5. If a status situation S is imbalanced, there will 
be pressures from within S to change in the 
direction of balance.
Note that all assumption 3 claims is that if a status situation is 
balanced there are no pressures for change that arise from the way 
characteristics and goal-objects are related to each other. The 
assumption does not, of course, preclude the possibility that there are 
pressures on the system from some other factor or source. What the 
assumption implies, rather, is that if in some concrete setting there is 
tension or pressures for change, but the status situation is balanced, 
the source of tension and pressure must be from some other factor. 
Assumption 5, on the other hand, claims that the status situation is a 
source of pressures for change, if imbalanced, but does not claim that 
any actual change will be observed. Again the caution taken in this 
assumption is due to the fact that some factors outside the status 
process may have an opposite effect, inhibiting actual change.
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5. Referential Structures.
In section 3 a distinction was made between local and referential 
comparisons. What distinguishes local from referential comparison is 
the presence of a stable frame of reference providing a standard in terms 
of which local comparisons are given meaning. Of course there are many 
different kinds of "frames of reference" in sociology and psychology; 
they are important in many different kinds of problems. But in defining 
status situations, the particular kind of frame of reference used by p 
has the following four components:
(a) generalized individuals,
(b) who possess given states of given characteristics,
(c) to which are associated given states of given goal-objects,
(d) where the characteristics and goal-objects are all status-valued.
A frame of reference having these four components will be called a 
referential structure.
A generalized individual is an individual such as "an airline 
mechanic" or "an automobile mechanic," as opposed to a particular, named 
individual like "Jones" or "Smith." Not being particulars, the states 
of characteristics attributed to generalized individuals are those they 
are seen typically to possess. Airline mechanics are typically highly 
skilled mechanics; apprentice automobile mechanics are typically 
unskilled. In the same way, goal-objects associated with the generalized 
individual are those typically allocated to the kind of people who have 
that much skill. Typically, skilled mechanics are paid $4.33 an hour. 
Finally, the states of each characteristic and the states of each goal- 
ob ject associated with the generalized individual have status-value.
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To function as a referential structure, it makes no difference how 
a frame of reference originally developed, or how some individual, p, 
happened to acquire it. There are in fact many different ways in which 
they develop, and many ways in which p acquires them. In Homans' 
billing office, for example, most of the girls probably acquired from 
fellow employees the conception that a ledger clerk was more skilled than 
a cash poster, and that the pay they shared in common was the pay suitable 
for the cash poster rather than the ledger clerk (Homans, 19 53). In 
other words, the referential structure was acquired through a process of 
socialization and social influence. In Adams' experiments, it is the 
experimenter who provides the subjects with the referential structure, 
communicating it as part of the experimental instructions-־even though 
Adams' own theory does not formulate the way in which such a frame of 
reference is important (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963; Adams 
and Jacobsen, 1964). In the airline strike of the summer of 1966, it 
was either through the mass media that airline mechanics learned that 
automobile mechanics typically made $4.33 an hour or else it was their 
union officials who told them so. It is even possible to think of 
individuals contriving their own personal frames of reference by 
inference from repeated local comparisons, so long as what they contrive 
is a referential structure containing general in place of particular 
individuals.
Given a referential structure, in our view of comparison p sees 
his own characteristics and goal-objects as similar to or different from 
those of generalized individuals in it. It is in terms of such similari­
ties and differences that his own characteristics and goal-objects acquire
their status significance; it is in terms of such similarities and 
differences that expectations emerge about which goal-objects he has a 
right to possess. Give p a job as sales clerk and he may see no 
significance in the fact that, like o who drives a delivery truck for 
the same firm, he is paid an hourly wage. But let him feel that he is 
similar to other viiite collar workers, and other white collar workers in 
the firm are paid a salary, and furthermore only blue collar workers 
are paid hourly: p will feel he has a right to expect a salary too and 
will define the method by which he is paid as degrading. The stage is 
set for a distributive justice process.
But for a distributive justice process to unfold, more is required 
than the simple existence of a referential structure. The referential 
structure must in addition have three fundamental properties: (a) It 
must be unitary, (b) It must be differentiated. (c) It must be balanced.
A unitary referential structure is one the generalized objects of 
which are associated with uniform states of C and GO. That is, if Y is 
an object of orientation in the structure, and C and GO are a character­
istic and a goal-object of the structure, Y is associated with just one 
state of C but not both, and just one state of GO but not both. If Y 
is equally likely to possess and or GO^ and GO^ the structure is 
not unitary. For example, if p believes airline mechanics are skilled 
and earn $4.33 an hour while "mechanic's helpers" are unskilled and earn 
$3.50 an hour, his referential structure is unitary. If p believes some 
airline mechanics are skilled but others are unskilled, and some earn 
$4.33 an hour but others earn $3.50 an hour, then p's referential 
structure is not unitary. The icportance of a unitary referential
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structure lies in the clear-cut expectation it creates. A structure that 
is not unitary can give rise only to conflicting expectations. But a 
distributive justice process is one in which p has well-defined expecta­
tions that are either met or violated. Conflicting expectations will 
not give rise to such a process. Hence only a unitary referential 
structure can generate a distributive justice process.
A referential structure is differentiated when both the high and 
low states of a characteristic, and both the high and low states of a 
goal-object, are contained in it. For p to fully grasp the significance 
of an imbalanced goal-object in a local comparison, he must know not 
only that it is not the goal-object associated with his own state of 
a characteristic, but also that it jj3 the goal-object associated with 
some other state. For the status significance of states and objects 
derives wholly from the other states and objects with which they are 
associated (by assumption 1). Thus, an airline mechanic must be aware 
not only that $3.52 is too little for a highly skilled mechanic, but 
also that it is the wage associated with unskilled mechanics, before 
$3.52 is fully interpreted.
A referential structure must be balanced because if it is not 
balanced it is unstable. If it is unstable, the status values of the 
referential structure will change; and quite as much as in a strictly 
local comparison p will be unable to define the local situation. The 
process that unfolds is without question an important one to understand 
if we are to fully comprehend the dynamics of status; but it will not be 
a distributive justice process. Instead it will be a process of dis­
integration and decay of the status value of rewards, a disappearance of
status distinctions formerly important, and a struggle to preserve the 
disintegrating status order by those to whom it meant much.
6. Emergency of Expectations about the Allocation of Goal־obiects.
In most general terms, the problem of distributive justice concerns 
itself with the relation between the actual allocation of status-valued 
elements, such as goal-objects, and the normative expectations about 
their allocation which have emerged in a given status situation. 
Therefore, to understand distributive justice we must show how elements 
of a given status situation acquire their status value and how the 
normative expectations for their allocation emerge.
What acquires status value are the particular characteristics and 
goal-objects possessed by p' and o; and it is about these elements 
that p's expectations emerge. The particular characteristics and goal- 
objects of p' and o, with the expectations held by p for the relations 
that ought to obtain between them, form the local system of a given 
status situation. A status situation, therefore, is made up of a local 
system and a referential structure. In analyzing how the local system 
acquires its status significance, and how expectations emerge about who 
in it should possess what goal-objects, we assume that the following 
conditions are given:
(1) The referential structure is unitary, differentiated, and 
balanced.
(2) The status value of the elements and the relevance bonds 
between them are initially undefined in the local system.
(3) Each state in the local system is similar to one and only 
one state in the referential structure.
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As we make use of these three conditions at several points, the numbers 
1, 2, and 3 are useful as cross-references. Any reference later to 
condition 1, or 2, or 3 therefore refers to the above three conditions.
The justification for condition 1 has already been given. In our 
view, for a distributive justice process to emerge at all, p must regard 
the referential structure as something unchallenged and unchallengeable 
either by himself or by people like himself. The structure, furthermore, 
must remain unchanged throughout the process.
The second condition is a simplifying condition. It might be 
possible to consider a more complicated case. Suppose that the elements 
of the local system were already defined, and p then became aware of 
similarities to a new referential structure about which he learned for 
the first time from some mass media source. The status values of the 
local system, which are determined by referential structures, should 
shift. And in fact, local systems probably fluctuate in this way a good 
deal. But for the present the task that presents itself is to account 
for the behavior of the simpler case in which initially the elements of 
the local system have not acquired status value at all.
Condition 3 rules out those cases in which one element of a local 
system is similar to two or more elements of a referential structure.
The purpose is to rule out those cases in which no transfer of status 
value from referential structure to local system would occur. Because 
referential structures are differentiated (by condition 1), a one-many 
relation between local system and referential structure would permit 
the possibility of one element of the local system being similar to two 
differently-valued elements of a referential structure. Therefore, no
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ttransfer of status value could take place (according to assumption 1).
On the other hand, the condition does not rule out the possibility that
two or more states of the local system are similar to one state of the
referential structure.
Given conditions 1, 2, and 3, states in the local system will
acquire the status value of the states to which they are similar in the
referential structure. This follows from assumption 1, the spread of
value assumption. To see how this follows, let p 1 and o be objects in
the local system, Y and Z be generalized objects in the referential
structure, c and go be states in the local system, and C and GO X X X X
be states in the referential structure (see figure 1). We know, 
because it is given in condition 3 that
5.1 c is similar to some state C .X X
Furthermore, we also know, because of conditions 1 and 2, that
6.2 c is an element that is not status-valued while
C is a status-valued element, x
From condition 3 it follows that
6.3 c^ ç is not similar to, associated with, or relevant to
any other state that is different from Cx in status value.
Therefore,
6.4 c acquires the status value of C ,X X
which follows from 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and assumption 1. In the same way it 
can be easily shown that, given the similarity of go to GO it followsX X
that
6.5 go acquires the status value of GO ,X x
again using assumption 1.
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insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1. How elements of the local system acquire status value.
Lines p-p', c and p-go are accounted for by deductions 6.4 and 6.5X X
on p. 30. The following conventions are followed in the diagram:
(1) states are shown by the letters c , go » C and GO , where lowerX X X  X
case letters are local and upper case letters are part of the referential 
structure. Only half the status situation is shown, because the process 
taking place is identical for the remaining half. (2) Objects are shorn 
by the letters p' and Z, where lower case letters are local and upper 
case letters are referential objects. A conjunction of an object and a 
state shows the state possessed by the object. (3) Relations are shown 
by different kinds of line segments : A signed-directed line is an 
evaluation of a state; an unsigned, bidirectional line indicates 
similarities; a directed brace shows association. Thus, figure 1 shows 
the positively evaluated portion of a status situation: The general 
object Z, possessing the state C^, is associated with the goal-object 
GO , both of which have positive status value. The states c and CX X X
are similar, as are the states go^ and GO^. As a consequence of 
assumption 1, p will positively evaluate the states c^ and g°x ♦
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To account for the way in which normative expectations about the 
possession of goal-objects emerge in the local system (see figure 2) we 
make use of assumption 2, the spread of relevance assumption. He know, 
as given, that
6.6 c is similar to some state CX X
and
6.7 C is associated with GOX X
and finally that
6.8 go is similar to some state GO .b x x
Therefore,
6.9 cx becomes relevant to that state gox which is
similar to the GO -state associated with C .x x
which follows from 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and assumption 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Porhaps it is useful to remark loss formally that what happens is 
that p, recognizing the status significance of elements in the local 
system and seeing their similarity to states in the referential structure, 
comes to regard it as right that he should be treated like anyone else 
who has the same status significance. Therefore he regards it as right 
that he, like anyone else having the same state, should have the goal- 
object go that "belongs" to the state c .X X
7. Distributive Justice.
As a result of the processes described in the previous section, we 
will find in p*s status situation two important features: (a) The states
«le— --------- T^ Vw׳
Figure 2. Emergence of hormative expectations about the possession of 
goal-objects in the local system. Line p ' , cx ־g°x is accounted for by 
result 6.9. The identical process takes place in the remaining half of 
the status situation, which is not shown in the figure. A broken directed 
brace is used to indicate relevance relations. Thus the figure shows 
that GO^ is the goal-object associated in the referential structure with 
Z, C ; p 1 , c is seen by p to be similar to Z, C and go is similar toX X  X °  X
GO^. Therefore p expects that objects in the local system that possess
state c ought to possess go . x x
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of c and go possessed by p 1 and o have acquired status significance,
(b) Relevance relations between states of c and go have emerged. We 
propose now to examine the consequences of actually allocating goal- 
objects to p 1 and o, given (a) and (b).
Allocation of goal-objects to p' and o creates a third important 
feature of the status situation: the actual possession by p' and o of 
goal-objects, which creates a new set of relations in the situation. 
All, some, or none of the association relations created by allocating 
goal-objects to p' and o may correspond to p's expectations. For 
example, figure 3 shows a local system in which p' and o have been 
allocated the goal-objects that p expected; the association relation 
coincides with the relevance relation on both the right and left sides 
of the figure. This is the sort of situation in which p' and o may be 
said to have the goal-objects they "deserve." In other words, the 
allocation of goal-objects is just in the sense typically given this 
expression.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figure 4 shows a local system in which p' and o have been allocated
goal-objects that fail to coincide with p's expectation; the association
relation on the right side of the figure fails to coincide with the
relevance relation that connects o, c x;ith go . One of p's two objectsa a
of orientation, therefore, has not been allocated the goal-object that is 
deserved. In other words, the allocation of goal-objects is un lust in the 
sense typically given this expression.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Figure 3. Just allocation of goal-ob 1ects to p 1 and o .
Solid braces show the actual possession of goal-objects by p* and o. 
Thus, p expects himself to possess the goal-object go and o to possess 
the goal-object g0^• Actual possession coincides with p's expectations, 
so that p' and o possess the goal-objects they "deserve" to possess.
Figure 4. Unjust allocation of goal-obiects to p 1 and o .
Both p' and o possess the positively-valued state c . Therefore pSi
expects that both will possess the positively-valued state go . Allocaâ
tion of the goal-objects fails to coincide with these expectations,
because o does not possess go , he possesses go , which is less thana b
he deserves.
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We are now in a position to define a state of distributive Justice. 
Let S* be a status situation in which status value and relevance relations 
have emerged, and goal-objects have been allocated.
Definition 4. (Distributive Justice) A state of distributive
justice exists in S* if and only if all associa­
tion relations created by allocating goal- 
objects coincide with relevance relations in 
the local system. Otherwise a state of 
injustice exists in S*.
If association and relevance relations coincide, the result is always 
a balanced status situation in the sense of definition 3. Furthermore, 
if they do not the result is always an imbalanced status situation.
7.1 If a state of distributive justice exists in S*,
S* is a balanced status situation. If a state 
of injustice exists in S*, S* is an imbalanced 
status situation.
The reason for 7.1 is perfectly straightforward. Relevance relations 
are determined by similarities between local and referential objects. 
Referential structures are always balanced (by condition 1). Therefore, 
relevance relations in the local system always connect states that have 
the same status value, forming balanced relational units in the local 
system. Any other relations that connect the same states will therefore 
also form balanced relational units. But associations formed between any 
other states will always connect states that have different status values, 
forming imbalanced relational units in the local system. It will always 
be the actual associations created by the allocation of goal-objects that 
create imbalance, if imbalance exists, because the relevance relations 
are always balanced. On the other hand, it is important to note that 
any failure of an association bond to coincide with expectations will 
always create an imbalance.
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From 7.1 and assumptions 3, 4, and 5 we immediately see that
7.2 If a state of distributive justice exists in S*,
the status situation S* is stable. If a state 
of injustice exists in S*, S* is unstable.
7.3 If a state of injustice exists in S*, there is
tension generated within the status situation.
7.4 If a state of injustice exists in S*, there will
be pressures from within S* to change it in the 
direction of balance.
All of which, of course, accords with the results obtained by such 
investigators as Adams (Adams, 1963; Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams and 
Jacobsen, 1964), Homans (19 53), Patchen (19 58; 1961) and Israel (1960).
Definition 4 has the valuable property that there is always one and 
only one state of justice for any given local system, and we are always 
able to say what that state is.
7.5 For every S* there is one and only one state of
distributive justice.
Given conditions 1, 2, and 3 we are always able to say what expectations 
p will develop for a given S*. This will always identify which way of 
allocating goal-objects in S* is just. For any given pattern of expecta­
tions, furthermore, there are only four ways of actually allocating goal- 
objects. (The logically possible cases are listed in figure 5. The 
first column shows the four possible patterns of expectations that can arise: 
nota that these are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The second column 
shows the four possible ways of allocating goal-objects, given a pattern of 
expectations in S*. The third column records which are just and which unjust. 
For any given structure of S*, that is for any given pattern of expectations, 
only one of the possible ways of allocating goal-objects is just.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Expected Allo­
cation of 
Goal-Objects 
To p' To o
Actual Allo­
cation of 
Goal-objects 
To p 1 To o
Distri­
butive
Justice
Type of 
Imbalance, 
if injus­
tice exists
Reward 
state 
of p' of 0
+ + + + yes balanced just just
+ + + ־ no other just under
+ + - - no collective under under
+ + - + no self under just
+ - + - yes balanced just just
־1־ - + + no other just over
+ - - + no collective under over
+ - ־ - no self under just
- + - + yes balanced just just
- + - - no other just under
- + + - no collective over under
- + + + no self over just
- - - - yes balanced jus t just
- - - + no other just over
- - + + no collective over over
־ - + - no self over just
Figure 5. Types of Balanced and Imbalanced Status Situations.
The sixteen cases are put in order according to the types of imbalances in 
column four.
«la section 3 we argued that over vs under-reward, collective vs 
individual imbalance, and self vs other imbalance all made a difference 
to how people will respond to injustice. If such distinctions do make a 
difference, it is only by making them that we will be able to discover 
regularities in the justice phenomenon. In the status value formulation 
making them is a simple and straightforward matter. The last two columns 
of figure 5 show the types of imbalance that occur for each pattern of 
expectations that emerges in S*.
What figure 5 shows is that, first, by reference to the referential 
structure, one always clearly distinguishes under from over-reward. Thus, 
the phenomenon that Homans studies, in which the ledger clerks are under- 
rewarded, is clearly distinct from the phenomenon that Adams studies, in 
which unqualified interviewers are over-rewarded (see examples in section 
1). And, while Adams does not theoretically conceptualize the condition, 
clearly the way in which he provides a referential structure as part of 
his experimental instructions is a •necessary condition of the striving 
behavior that he reports as a result.
Second, one can always clearly distinguish collective from individual 
injustice. The collectively unjust system may be expected to show coali- 
tion behavior that is not open to the individually unjust. That such 
coalitions will result is shown by experiments such as the following:
Three college students are required to perform a task in which more 
points are yielded by coalitions than by individual performance. One of 
the three students is a paid participant, the other two are naive subjects. 
The paid participant has sufficient knowledge of how the task is performed 
that on the first of five trials in the experiment he always earns more
­בצ­
points than either of the other two students. In one condition this 
initial point advantage is made to appear just because the paid participant 
is defined as more able at the task (as shown by an initial test); in the 
other condition the paid participant is defined as having the same ability 
as the two naive subjects, so that the initial advantage is unjust. In 
the unjust condition, the two naive subjects will enter into more coali­
tions against the paid participant, and refuse more of his own coalition 
overtures, than in the just condition. In the just condition the naive 
subjects are more willing to enter into coalitions with the paid parti­
cipant, and more willing to give him an advantage in points, instead of 
forming coalitions between themselves against him. (Cf Hoffman,
Festinger and Lawrence, 19 54.)
Third, when it is only one member of a system who is imbalanced, self 
is always distinct from other imbalance. This makes it possible to 
clearly interpret the results of an experiment like the following:
Female students compete in a contest requiring aesthetic ability. They 
compete in pairs for a prize perfume bottle. In each pair they are 
defined as almost identical in ability, though just one wins the prize־- 
the one who has a negligibly greater number of points, such as 1 or 2 out 
of 100. In one condition, the system thus created is one in which both 
contestants are superior in ability, but one wins and one loses the prize. 
In the other condition, the system thus created is one in which both 
contestants are inferior in ability, but again one wins and one loses 
the prize. In each condition, though the system as a whole is imbalanced, 
one can clearly identify one subject as balanced and one as imbalanced, 
and their behavior is of course quite different. (Cf Israel, 1960.)
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8. Summary.
Distributive justice is concerned with the way rewards are allocated. 
In all formulations of this process, the essential idea is that actors who 
are similar in terms of socially defined and valued characteristics expect 
to be similar in their rewards. If not, normative expectations are 
violated. The violation of such expectations produces tension and 
pressures for change.
The most important current formulations of this process are in 
terms of social exchange. But these formulations fail to take into 
account the nature and importance of status value in distributive justice, 
give ambiguous and confusing accounts of the comparison process by which 
actors define similarity or dissimilarity, fail to account for the 
distinctively normative character of the process, and fail to give 
meaningful and precise definitions of either justice or injustice.
An alternative way of conceptualizing distributive justice is in 
terms of status value. A theory of status value is concerned with evalua­
tions of worth, honor, or any synonym of these (merit, esteem, prestige, 
etc.). It describes the way in which definitions of status significance 
and expectations spread. It also describes the conditions under which 
status situations are stable or unstable.
In the theory of status value comparisons are formulated in terms of 
referential structures. A distinction is made between particular social 
objects, such as the actor himself or other actors with whom he actually 
interacts, and generalized objects of orientations, of whom an actor holds 
stereotyped, unitary conceptions. Among other things, referential
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structures contain information about rewards, or more exactly, goal-objects, 
typically associated with generalized objects.
Referential structures determine, first, the status significance of 
characteristics and goal-objects possessed by particular actors, and 
second, the expectations actors come to hold about the manner in which 
goal-objects may legitimately be allocated. In the context of the status 
significance and normative expectations created by the referential structure, 
actual allocations of goal-objects either coincide with expectations 
or do not. Those that coincide with expectations are defined as just; 
those that do not are unjust. A state of distributive justice is always 
a balanced status situation, while injustice is always an imbalanced 
status situation. Balanced status situations are stable, imbalanced 
status situations produce tensions and pressures for change.
The main results of formulating the process in terms of status value 
and referential structures are
(1) The necessary conditions of distributive justice are much 
clearer, because the significance of a balanced referential structure 
emerges and is given great prominence. In the absence of this 
structure the process that develops is equally important but 
different from distributive justice.
(2) The definition of the state of distributive justice becomes 
meaningful and precise. There is always one and only one state of 
distributive justice for each status situation, and its meaning
is always exact.
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(3) The meaning of each state of injustice becomes equally 
precise, and important distinctions are made that are obscured by 
other formulations, including the differences between: (a) over and 
under-reward, which cannot be distinguished in the absence of a 
referential structure; (b) collective vs individual justice־־ 
collective injustice being typically confused with "just" situations;
(c) self vs other imbalance. This should improve our chances of 
finding and stating regularities in the behavior of people in 
unjust situations.
(4) Processes formerly obscured emerge as important for future 
investigation. These include: (a) the problem of anomic status 
situations, for which there is no referential structure; (b) the 
problem of imbalanced referential structures, for which there is 
a referential structure, but the structure is itself in the 
process of changing, either by devaluing goal-objects or breaking 
down status distinctions.
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